This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring "structural policy windows" and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper conducts a number of statistical panel analyses using fixed effects. The results show interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these recurring structural windows in particular--the budget process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent with the theory that these interests are attempting to have legislators attach (de)regulatory riders to the budget bills. Other characteristics of the legislatures, such as rules regarding disclosure laws, term limits, and electoral factors show little statistical impact on lobbying by interest groups. Overall, the paper argues that these structural policy windows largely determine lobbying expenditures on the margin.
of these "structural policy windows," such as the budgeting process, will recur periodically, drawing interest groups to the process. We will argue that it is these types of structural policy windows that, on the margin, create the timing for intense lobbying by special interests.
In order to identify these legislative structures that attract interest group activity, though, the theoretical and empirical work must be comparative and time-series in nature to identify the necessary variation across legislative institutions. However, comparative statistical empirical work on the timing of interest group activity is non-existent in the literature. This paper attempts to remedy this shortcoming in the literature by examining institutional variation in the states.
The first kind of institutional variation explored is the electoral features of institutions that change from election to election that may affect the behavior of interest groups. The timing of elections, divided government, ideologically extreme government, and large majorities by the party in power may all offer interest groups an opportunity to increase (or mute) their activity in expectation of outcomes. The second class of institutional variation examined includes the legislative features that may influence the way interest groups behave. At its most broad level, the constitutional requirements that affect the frequency of convening the legislature and the content of legislation (and in particular budgeting) that politicians may consider can have an affect on the timing and intensity of interest group activity. At a more minute level, the details regarding term limitations, professionalization of legislatures, the power of the legislature to review agency decisions, and the power of the legislature to overturn the executive could also affect the behavior of interest groups. This paper explores in a comparative way the role of design and electoral features of legislatures in affecting interest group activity. In doing so, it moves from a well-documented micro-view of how interest groups behave in individual issues to a macro-view of how interest groups allocate their efforts based on the features of governmental institutions and the policy windows that arise therefrom. It uses a panel data set of lobbying expenditures by interest groups in thirty-three states collected from the Ethics Commissions of each state. It exploits variation in the structure of legislatures, the make-up of legislatures, and electoral factors impinging on legislators to identify how institutional design and electoral factors affects lobbying effort by interest groups.
The paper has a number of findings. First, it shows that certain institutional design features explain most of the variation in lobbying across states. In particular, budgets are a magnet for special interests, and we see a substantial increase in lobbying during time periods when budgets are being written. While recognized in the budgeting literature, this point has been largely lost in the interest group literature. Second, lobbying intensity actually decreases in election years, relative to off-election years. Despite the reported willingness of politicians to pass legislation close to elections so that credit-claiming can occur, interest groups do not increase their activity in response to the timing of elections. Moreover, broader electoral factors, such as the make-up of government, have little effect on the lobbying intensity of interest groups.
Only the size of the majority in the state senates is consistently shown to have a statistically significant affect on lobbying efforts by interest groups. This suggests that electoral factors may not be as important as once thought in affecting the intensity of interest group activity. Third, business groups account for on average 86% of the lobbying expenditures in the nine states for which we have detailed data. This is substantially more than the proportion of PAC contributions that corporate and trade groups donate to candidate campaigns (62%). Moreover, these same business groups re the prime drivers behind the increased lobbying during budget creation. This suggests that business and trade groups seek to exert influence through the budgeting process http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art68 disproportionately relative to other groups. However, business groups have much lower variation in lobbying effort from year to year than any other category of special interests. These latter two results combined suggest that small changes in business group lobbying can have big effects on overall lobbying expenditures. Fourth, groups substantially influenced by the state budget and groups not substantially affected by the state budget both increase lobbying during budget years. This latter result is consistent with the view that non-budget groups may be encouraging legislators to attach non-budgetary riders to the budget bill that have higher probability of passage than stand-alone legislation would. Finally, laws governing the activities of interest groups, and laws governing disclosure of interest group activities, show no measurable effect on total amount of lobbying activity disclosed.
Taken together, these results suggest that the structural features of political institutions have a large effect on the timing and intensity of interest group lobbying by creating recurring policy windows. This includes provisions regarding when legislatures meet and their budgeting process. The paper also demonstrates that groups affected primarily by regulation also increase their lobbying during the budgetary process, consistent with the idea that these groups use the budget as vehicle for regulatory and de-regulatory riders. Finally, the paper also shows that lobbying is largely a business phenomenon, more so than the financing of campaigns, driven by corporate groups that maintain a relatively fixed presence in the state legislature. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the paper outlines a theoretical framework and discusses why current empirical papers have not yet explored the timing of interest group lobbying. Section III describes the core of data, methods, and empirical results.
Sections IV, V, and VI offer three empirical extensions to the main results. These sections examine the composition of interest group effort as it compares to PACs, as it relates to type of interest group, and as it relates to issue areas, respectively. The paper concludes in Section VII.
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL UNDERPINNINGS

A. FRAMEWORK: THE DETERMINANTS OF POLICY WINDOWS
We begin by developing a framework for understanding the timing of interest group lobbying. Although there are a number of theories of interest group activity, there are no formal or informal theories on the timing of interest lobbying of which we are aware.
2 There is, however, a common thread in the interest group literature suggesting that interest groups become active when policy windows open. In these theories, policy windows arise through two main processes. First, policy windows arise through the political entrepreneurship of legislators and the "offensive" activity of interest groups in creating these policy windows (Wilson 1980 , Lowi 1964 . Individual legislators are constantly seeking issues with which they can be identified to enhance their re-electability. Interest groups support legislators in these pursuits, creating and disseminating information to change the climate for an opening of the window (Fenno 1973) .
Through this mechanism, policy windows are created endogenously, through the planning of interest groups and legislators.
A second method by which policy windows arise is through exogenous and or environmental events which refocus legislator attention on a given policy area (Price 1978) . For example, the September 11 attacks upon the World Trade Centers created a policy window for the airlines, the Enron and MCI accounting scandals created a policy window for "good governance" interest groups, and the eastern seaboard electrical grid failure created a policy window for both the energy industry and environmentalists. In this approach to policy windows, special interests are largely viewed as opportunists, targeting their lobbying when their favored positions are most likely to be adopted (Arnold 1990 , Walker 1991 . In this model, interest groups lobby intensively when these exogenous events happen.
However, there exists a third mechanism through which recurring policy windows arise-structural mechanisms in the legislature. That is, features of institutions determine the creation of policy windows, and thus the timing of interest group activities. The rules and procedures of the legislature determine when recurring policy windows arise. (Muthoo and Shepsle 2003) . A short-sighted electorate with a limited retrospective voting rule values recent activity by legislators rather than activity far in the past (Fiorina 1981) . Credit claiming for recent deeds is more effective than claims for votes far in the past if the electorate has a high discount factor, as many believe. The politicians are seeking issues and pork to take home; interest groups help to target politicians' attention to those issues which are likely to garner the most votes (Shepsle et al 2002 , Grossman and Helpman 1999 , 2001 , Hall and Wayman 1990 . The more precarious the position of the legislator in the election, the more likely are interest groups to press their cause. As elections draw near, legislators are more likely to open themselves to informational lobbying. This view suggests that interest group lobbying will tend to increase at or near the time of elections.
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Although there are these intermittent periods of elections, there are also other short-term electoral factors that affect interest group activity. Short-term electoral factors have been prominently discussed in the literature related to the political make-up of government. It has long been believed that unified government allows enfranchised interest groups to more efficiently seek benefits from the parties they support. Because of this, interest groups adjust their lobbying (Wiggins et al 1992) . For example, when Republicans are in power in a unified government, business interest groups lobby to obtain additional policies that an unencumbered legislature can deliver (Kollman 1997 , Mayhew 1974 . In this approach, these structural features of legislatures may create those policy windows to be exploited.
One can also frame this discussion of structural policy windows in terms of costs and benefits to legislators. In the structural/budget policy window view, the benefit to legislators of passing policy is constant throughout the legislator's term in office. However, it is less costly for the legislator to pass policy when the structural policy windows, such as budgets, are up for consideration. The budget is a bill which must pass; it is generally believed to be easier to attach riders to these "omnibus" bills rather than pass a stand-alone bill (Oleszek 1996) . Thus, the most opportune time for interest groups to become active is during the budgeting process and policy window. We can contrast this to the WHYDFML model. Although the cost is higher to pass bills as stand-alone propositions close to elections (Krutz 2001) , the benefit to legislators is substantial to having bills pass at that time. Provided the benefit outweighs the cost, legislators will try to pass bills close to elections. In this model, interest groups will become active during the electoral policy window and will engage in lobbying during that time.
This paper explores these recurring structural determinants of interest group lobbying. It explores the effect of budgeting, legislative sessions, and electoral factors on the behavior of interest groups in the states. It also examines predictions from the WHYDFML and retrospective voting theories. We seek to understand to what extent interest groups are exerting effort to influence legislation through lobbying, the timing and composition of that effort, how that effort compares to campaign finance, and how this effort changes with the features of the government.
B. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND DATA LIMITATIONS
The empirical studies of interest groups have been centered on an examination of interest group activity at the federal level. Papers that have examined congressional lobbying have focused, generally, on three types of analyses. First, papers have statistically and descriptively examined individual issues to describe how competing interest groups position themselves to lobby over a given issue (Rothenberg 1992, Derthick and Quirk 1985;  for an excellent summary, see Smith 1995, Baumgartner and Leech 1998) . These studies, however, have a number of limitations because they are generally on single issues, thus one cannot compare lobbying behavior across issues.
This has led to a second set of papers covering lobbying expenditures at the federal level (Baumgartner and Leech 2001 , Ansolabehere et al 2003 , de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002 .
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 provided data to scholars on annual lobbying expenditures at the federal level. While these papers yield results on the make-up of lobbying expenditures, the degree of access accorded to interest groups, and the effectiveness of lobbying effort, the analysis is almost always cross-sectional, based on one year of data. Moreover, because the data is only at the federal level where budgeting, for example, occurs annually, it is difficult to identify any structural, comparative, or timing issues that can be analyzed.
A final important literature this paper speaks to is the literature on lobbying at the state level. Lowery and Gray (2000) have extensively examined the number of lobbyist registrations across the states. Taking registrations at periodic intervals (usually 5-years apart), the authors have developed a theory of interest representation based upon the population ecology variables of competition and legitimation. This data has been used to explore a number of factors affecting the prevalence of interest groups in states. Complementing their work is a host of case studies that have examined similar issues Thomas 1992, 1993 The purpose of this paper is to push the analysis up a level and examine which institutional variables affect lobbying effort and timing by interest groups. Building upon the host of studies that have examined the microfoundations of lobbying, this paper will examine the sources of institutional variation and features that drive the lobbying effort.
III. CORE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. DATA
The panel dataset employed in this section is comprised of state-year aggregate lobbying expenditures across all states where available. The total aggregate lobbying expenditure by state by year was obtained from each state (either the Ethics Commission or the relevant office).
Thirty-three states provided us with the data. The range of time periods is 3 years to 25 years of data for each state. All data is converted to 2000 real dollars, deflated by the consumer price 6 There has been one recent statistical study examining the timing of lobbying in administrative agencies de Figueiredo and Kim (2004) . Stratmann (1998) and Snyder (1992) have examined the timing of PAC contributions. Austen- Smith (1993) has developed a model of lobbying for agenda setting and then for votes, however, this is usually considered within the same bill. 7 Baumgartner and Leech (2000) , in an unpublished paper, have recognized the importance of budgetary interest group behavior in a cross-section of the federal data.
index (CPI-U). To create our dependent variable for the statistical analyses, we take the log of the state's per capita lobbying expenditure in a given year. 8 A full description of all the data and the data sources is provided in the Appendix.
There are three sets of independent variables. The first set measures the electoral structure and party factors that might affect interest group activity. This includes variables on whether there is an election in the current time period for legislative seats, whether there is unified government, whether there is Democratic unified government, and the size of the majorities in the House and Senate of each state.
A second set of variables includes characteristics of the institutional legislative design and legislative process of each state. These variables measure whether the legislature is required to meet in regular session, whether the legislature is required to meet in special session, and whether the state is required to engage in creating a new budget in a particular year. We code these as dummy variables with a one if the state is in a regular session in a special session, or in a budget year, and zero otherwise, for the three separate variables.
A third set of independent variables provides controls for the state characteristics that move over time. This includes data on the state's per capita income. We also include variables for the year and the year-squared. and Oregon has biennial regular sessions and biennial budgeting. We provide the data in Figure   1 . What is striking about these three graphs is their responsiveness to budgeting process. While
New York sees a steady increase in real lobbying expenditures, Oregon's and Wisconsin's lobbying expenditures increase substantially in budget years, and drop in off-budget years. In addition, comparing Oregon to Wisconsin, we seem to see a regular session effect as well. This descriptive data provides initial support to the fact that institutional design may affect interest group effort, and in particular, budgeting may be the focal point for interest groups on the margin. However, to more examine the hypotheses in the paper, we turn to a multivariate statistical analysis.
C. METHOD
In order to examine the empirical validity of the theoretical framework, we conduct an OLS regression on panel data. One concern that naturally arises in this kind of panel study is that states differ widely in their lobbying disclosure rules. What is considered lobbying in one state is not considered lobbying in another state, and thus need not be reported. To control for this, we use state fixed-effects in all of our statistical analyses. The fixed effects estimation method controls for differences across states, and allows us to measure within state variation over time with these panel data methods (Hsiao 2002 Taken together, these results suggest that the timing of sessions and budgeting bring out interest group activity in the legislature. While most electoral factors seem not to have an effect on the timing of lobbying, there are two exceptions. First, the size of the senate majority has a persistent and statistically significant negative effect on lobbying. In addition, elections tend to decrease lobbying (relative to off-election years) unless the legislature is in session, in which case, the total electoral effect is substantively close to zero.
E. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS
In order to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 1 , we conduct a number of tests whose results we present in Table 2 . First, we explore the possibility that the size of the budget is what drives aggregate lobbying expenditures. To this end, we construct a variable that represents the amount of the budget under consideration in each year. 9 We present the results in Model 5 of Table 2 . A 1% increase in the budget results in an 8% increase in lobbying expenditures. This is consistent with results in the earlier models. The effect of Regular Session is slightly less than in previous models. The only electoral variables which have statistically significant coefficients are the Size of Majority variables. The Election Year Variable and the interactive variable are not statistically significant, but their magnitudes are almost the same as before. 9 We take the amount of the budget in any given year. For those with biennial budgets, a problem arises. In the offyears, the budget is zero. We could model this, but then if we take logs, these observations disappear. Moreover the results, if we just use budget levels, are similar to the dummy variable specification. To address this concern, we use 90% of the two-year budget in the budgeted year, and 10% of the budget in the second year. The rationale is that in any given off-year, up to 10% of the budget can be re-budgeted during special session to accommodate fiscal needs. Thus, the amount of budget up for grabs is about 10% of the entire budget. We then adjust the budget for per capita spending then take logs.
Second, there may be other institutional features that affect lobbying that have been missed in the main analysis. We have catalogued six types of institutional structures that might affect the intensity and timing of lobbying: the presence of budget caps (Primo 2003) , legislative term limits (Primo and Milyo 2004) , the degree of professionalization of the legislature (Fiorina 1994; Maestas 2000) , the number of seats in the state house and senate chambers, the size of the veto-proof majority (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2004) , and the ease with which the legislature can overturn administrative agencies (Weingast and Moran 1983) . We measure these variables as noted in the Appendix. One problem with including them in the statistical analysis, however, is that these do not change within state over time. Therefore one cannot used state fixed effects in a regression if one hopes to include these variables. However, one can use a random effects model.
To test the veracity of the random effects model, Model 6 replicates Model 4 using random effects. The coefficient estimates and the statistical significance of those coefficients are very close across the models. A Hausman specification test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the fixed effects and random effects models are the same at the 95% level of confidence. Having established the comparability of the random effects and fixed effects model, we then include in Model 7 the variables measuring the additional institutional features using random effects. None of the additional institutional structure variables have statistically significant coefficients, suggesting we can reject the hypothesis that they influence total lobbying expenditures at the 95% level of confidence.
A fourth issue is whether lobbying disclosure regulations are driving the result. Some authors have suggested that tighter lobbying disclosure regulations result in less lobbying because disclosure can tarnish the reputation of the lobbyists and the lobbying profession (Brinig et al 1994) . Other authors have argued that lobbying regulations have little effect on lobbying firms (Lowery and Gray 1997) . These papers cite as evidence for these points of view the number of lobbyists registered. In conducting this robustness check, we also hope to settle this argument by employing, as the dependent variable, actual lobbying expenditures.
There are two general types of lobbying disclosure rules. The first are the types that expand the definition of lobbying. These include new rules that include small gifts to legislators as lobbying expenditures, rules that include certain types of events as lobbying expenditures, and rules that expand the definition of lobbying activities (such as to include any meetings with legislators rather than just those to discuss a specific bill). These types of changes in lobbying rules should result in an increase in lobbying expenditures disclosed. A second type of disclosure rule is one that does not expand the definition of lobbying, but requires groups to disclose their lobbying expenditures in a more detailed and refined way. For example, rules that require interest groups to categorize their lobbying expenditures and rules that require lobbying groups disclose their source of funding should not increase disclosed lobbying expenditures per se, but should offer the public more disclosure on the current expenditures.
In Model 8, we replicate the base Model 4 using these variables. Neither type of disclosure law has an effect on the reported amount of lobbying activity by interest groups.
This result is consistent with Lowery and Gray (1997) who show that tougher lobbyist registration rules in the state have no effect on the number of lobbying registration, but inconsistent with (Brinig et al 1994) . We can make a similar statement about the effect of disclosure laws on the reported amount of lobbying. On the whole, these sets of laws lead to no change in disclosed aggregate lobbying expenditures. This, however, does not mean that there is no change in lobbyist behavior (as has been suggest in earlier work), only that whatever changes there are (if any) do not show up in disclosed aggregate lobbying expenditures.
Overall, this section generally supports the previous results and suggests that the legislative structure of government, determined by frequency of sessions and the budgeting process, are the primary drivers of total aggregate lobbying expenditures. Moreover, other factors, such as budget caps, term limits, professionalization of legislatures, and lobbying disclosure rules have little impact on lobbying expenditures.
IV. FIRST EMPIRICAL EXTENSION: PACs and LOBBYING
The remainder of this paper unpacks the intensity and timing of lobbying expenditures by groups by measuring and analyzing the composition of lobbying. In Table 4 , we contrast the distribution of lobbying expenditures with PAC contributions.
The data sources are listed in the table. 11 At the federal level, business (corporations and trade associations) comprise 67% of PAC giving, while they comprise 84% of lobbying expenditures.
At the state level, these business groups comprise 62% of special interest contributions, but 86% of lobbying expenditures. Labor groups comprise 9% of federal PAC contributions, and 6% of 10 Whether this means that business interests exert more influence in lobbying than do labor and issue groups is unclear. Only future study will allow us to understand this question. Moreover, this preliminary finding helps to flesh out earlier studies that find that business interests have far more lobbyist registrations than labor and membership groups. This higher number of registrations is manifested in more lobbying expenditures. 11 The data on state PAC/Special Interest money is approximate. The National Institute of State Campaign Finance hires contractors to collect from the states data on all state campaign finance contributions. We have checked their data against state records (collected by the state election commissions) against Jensen and Beyle (2003) . We find that generally the data is within 5-10% of each other. We then used the classification system from the NISCF to classify the state PAC data. Ideological and Party Groups were classified as Ideological/Membership. Unions and Civil Service/Retirement groups were classified as Unions. All others were classified as corporations and trade associations collectively. The data in Tables 4 provide the detailed data on the state level for the nine states listed in Table 3. federal lobbying, while at the state level, labor groups comprise 16% of special interest contributions to campaigns and only 2% of lobbying expenditures. Finally, although membership and ideological groups make up a roughly equivalent percentage of campaign finance contributions at the federal and state level (22%-23%), they represent 7% of lobbying expenditures at the state level and only 2% at the federal level. Overall, these results suggest that lobbying is largely a business phenomenon at both the state and federal level, but business focuses more on lobbying and less on campaign finance at the state level than the federal level.
V. SECOND EMPIRICAL EXTENSION: GROUPS AND LOBBYING
Understanding the commonalities to the PAC literature, we now turn our efforts to examining the timing of lobbying by these types of interest groups. In particular, we are interested in knowing which types of groups are causing the spikes in lobbying during budget years. We take the categorization given above, and examine whether different types of groups time their lobbying in systematically discernible ways. Table 5 Model 9 includes lobbying by firms, Model 10 includes lobbying by trade associations, Model 11 uses lobbying by unions, Model 12 uses lobbying by government agencies, and Model 13 uses lobbying by membership groups. In all the models the coefficients on Budget Year and Regular Session are positive. In Models 9 and 10 (collectively business), per capita lobbying expenditures are 40% higher for firms and 28% higher for trade associations in budget years than non-budget years. These results are statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. In Models 11, 12, and 13, we see that per capita lobbying expenditures are 38% higher, 50% higher, and 84% higher for unions, governments, and membership groups, respectively, in budget years relative to non-budget years. These coefficients, however, do not reach the standard levels of statistical significance, perhaps because of the few degrees of freedom. Although a handful of other coefficients are statistically significant, there is no systematic pattern. However, it is worthwhile noting that unions are the only type of interest group that has a positive coefficient on Election Year and negative coefficient on the interaction term. In addition, government interest groups increase their lobbying substantially during periods of unified government.
Taken together, these results lead us to a number of interpretations of the data. First, all groups lobby at substantially higher levels when the legislature is in regular session, but none of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% level. Second, the increase in lobbying expenditures during budget years seems to be driven by business, and not by unions or government agencies. Third, given the relative magnitude of the budget coefficients of the five models, businesses exhibit lower variation in lobbying expenditures from year to year than other organizations. This fact, combined with the fact that business account for over 80% of lobbying expenditures (noted in the previous section), suggests that businesses and membership groups maintain a continued presence in state capitals, lobbying on a regular basis, while other groups maintain a more sporadic lobbying effort. Moreover, when budgets arise, businesses and membership groups raise their lobbying expenditures somewhat. However, because businesses represent such a large percentage of total lobbying expenditures, the 30-35% increase in lobbying expenditures they engage in during budget years means they create a large increase in aggregate state lobbying expenditures. Fundamentally, the spikes seen in the biennial budgeting states shown in Figure 1 are generated by business interest groups.
VI. THIRD EMPIRICAL EXTENSION: ISSUE AREAS AND LOBBYING
In a final empirical extension, we examine the extent to which groups affected by different policies of government time their lobbying differently. We do this by examining the timing of lobbying by issue area. We classify each interest group in these nine states as primarily concerned with one of thirty-two issue areas. We then create two main "types" of interest group categories: groups which are affected by budgetary and regulatory rules of the state, and those groups which are affected primarily by regulatory rules.
To implement this, we use a classification system developed by Wolak et al (2004) .
Wolak et al obtained the names of every interest group that lobbied at the state level in 1997
(over 34,000 in total). They then categorized each group by topic area they identified. We have taken the Wolak et al coding and merged it into our file, adding eight additional categories to obtain more fine-grained detail. However we have panel data, and new interest groups enter every year into each state. We conducted web searches until every interest group was identified using this classification. Table 6 presents the classification.
In addition to the two broad categories we identified above, we also examine issue areas where the lobbying efforts by interest groups which most legislators might like to "hide" from their constituents. These issue areas, such as tobacco firm lobbying, pharmaceutical lobbying, real estate developer lobbying, alcohol lobbying, and gambling industry lobbying, may be particularly problematic for legislators, and we examine this is more detail.
We recognize this classification is somewhat stylized and rough. In reality, there is a continuum between how much an interest group is affected by budgets and how much an interest group is affected by regulation. We do believe to a first approximation, however, that these budget categories reflect where the preponderance of state's influence is on the special interest's business (e.g. education is both budgetary and regulatory, while insurance is primarily regulatory). That said, we have experimented with a number of reasonable reclassifications and find the results discussed below are robust to these reclassifications.
As before, we sum each topic area's expenditures, so that we know how much agriculture is spending in each state by year; how much health groups are spending in each state by year, etc.
for the nine states. We aggregate the lobbying expenditures by interest group category or issue by state on a per capita basis and take logs to create the final dependent variables, and run models similar to the previous section, using OLS with both state and topic area fixed effects.
Given that budgetary issues can only be handled within the budget framework, one would expect that these issues would result in more lobbying within the legislature during budget years than non-budget years. Regulatory issues, on the other hand, do not result in the direct transfer of money from the government to the interest groups in contracts or spending, but are molded by government policies and regulatory power to create the competitive environment. Because these regulations can be passed at any time, there are two factors that affect the timing of regulatory lobbying expenditures. On one hand, it is less costly to pass policy proposals that are attached as riders to the budget, rather than stand-alone bills, because the budget must pass annually, and the process of amending the budget in committee (or on the floor) is generally less onerous than passing a regulation as a stand-alone feature (Oleszek 1996 , Krutz 2001 . Thus, from a cost perspective, interest groups are more likely to have success passing regulatory rules during budgeting, and therefore we should see an increase in regulatory lobbying during budget years.
On the other hand, in a retrospective voting model with heavy discounting, legislators may get more credit for passing legislation close to the election rather than in previous time periods. If this is the case, then legislators benefit more passing legislation close to the election rather than earlier. In a biennial budgeting state, higher benefit would be conveyed in the off-budget year (or the election year). This would lead to more incentive to pass bills in the off-budget year.
Which effect dominates is an empirical matter. If we see regulatory groups lobbying more heavily in budget years, we assume that the "rider" effect dominates. However, if we see regulatory groups lobbying more heavily in election years, then the "retrospective voting" effect dominates. Table 7 presents the results. Model 14 presents the results for budgetary and regulatory issues, Model 15 presents the results for primarily regulatory issues, and Model 16 presents the results for "hidden groups." In Model 14, the coefficient on Budget Year is positive and statistically significant. There is, not surprisingly, a 39% increase in lobbying by groups concerned with budgetary issues during budget years. There is a 50% decrease in lobbying by these same groups during election years, though a session during an election year leads to slightly more lobbying on net (through the interactive effect). Unified government of either party leads to 46% more lobbying than during spells of divided government.
Many of the results in Model 15 are similar. Groups that are concerned primarily about regulatory issues lobby even more in budget years, on the margin, than those concerned about budgets. There is 49% increase in lobbying for these groups during budget years, an increase which is statistically significant at the 99% level. Special sessions also result in more regulatory lobbying. The Election Year coefficients are not statistically significant. Republican unified government results in 30% additional lobbying than non-unified government, while Democratic unified government results in 9% less lobbying than non-unified government. This latter result actually points to groups affected by regulation may be lobbying heavily for deregulation rather than regulation. In sum, despite having fewer budgetary concerns, groups primarily affected by regulations do more lobbying during budgetary years and during Republican unified government.
Finally, Model 16 includes regressions for "hidden groups," those groups that legislators likely wish to hide from the voters. These groups show no discernible pattern of lobbying, as no variable has a coefficient that is statistically significant. These groups would seem to spread their lobbying effort evenly across time, political and electoral factors, and institutional structures.
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Overall, these final results paint an interesting picture of the composition of the lobbying effort by interest groups. While groups affected by the budget do increase their lobbying expenditures during budget years, groups not affected by the budget also increase their lobbying expenditures during budget years. One reason for this may be that these latter groups are attempting to create or prevent riders from being attached to the budget that will affect the regulations that govern them. Indeed, given the budget bill must pass on an annual basis, attaching riders to the budget is a less costly mechanism for passing regulations than is passing the bill in stand-alone form. The fact that regulatory lobbying picks up when there is Republican unified government is yet another indication that groups seeking lower hurdles for regulation may be lobbying during this opportune moment-when friends in office are passing must-pass budgetary legislation-offering a good time for attaching riders to the budget bill. Note that controversial groups, whose lobbying efforts legislators might want to hide from the voters, seem to blend into other lobbying efforts, demonstrating no discernible statistical pattern in lobbying.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper seeks to complement the extensive micro-oriented (or single vote or singleissue) literature on interest groups by examining the macro-determinants and timing of interest group lobby. In doing so, it has argued that there are three types of policy windows that arise for interest groups: endogenous windows, exogenous windows, and structural windows. The paper argues that structural windows can have a significant effect on the timing of interest group lobbying. Employing a new dataset of lobbying at the state level, the paper exploits cross-state and time-series variation to determine how features of government affect lobbying expenditures.
The paper demonstrates that interest groups increase their activities substantially when the legislature is in regular session and when the legislature is engaged in budgeting. It also demonstrates that much of this budget year effect can be explained by business and trade groups expanding lobbying efforts during budget years. Unions and government agencies do not increase lobbying efforts during this time.
Moreover, businesses, which comprise on average 86% of all lobbying expenditures within a given state, have much lower variance in lobbying than other groups. This is consistent with the idea that businesses maintain a steady and continued presence in legislatures, while other types of interest groups expand and contract their lobbying as their resources and the issues that interest them, rise and decline in the legislature. Additionally, interest groups largely unaffected by the budget numbers also lobby during budgetary time periods. One reason for this is that they may be encouraging legislators to use the budget as a vehicle on which to attach non- 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art68 Categorization of each interest group into 24 issue areas as defined by Wolak et al (2004) . We create eight additional categories which more finely define the issues. For interest groups with missing data, we conduct a web search to determine to which category the group belongs. 
